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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~IORONI

F. BOTT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

CAsE

No. 9539

A. ~1. REEBER, aka ADOLPH M.
REEDER, and wife ADA M. REEDER,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
The nature of the present case is an action brought
by the purchaser of lands for specific performance and
a counter claim by the Defendant vendors for the purchase price, together with interest.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT
The disposition of the case made in the lower Court
was that the Court granted specific performance to the
vendee conditioned on his payment of the purchase price
to Defendant vendors.
EXACT NATURE OF TI-lE RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendants-Appellants seek on appeal to recover
interest at the legal rate on the balance of $2621.58 owed
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them by the Plaintiff-Respondent for the purchase price
of certain lands sold by Defendants-Appellants to Plaintiff-Respondent which balance was owing DefendantsAppellants for a period from September 1943, to the time
a deed was delivered to Plaintiff-Respondent in August
of 1961.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August of 1943 Defendant, A.M. Reeder, executed
and delivered to Plaintiff a memorandum of an agreement
to the effect that Defendant, A. M. Reeder agreed to sell
to the Plaintiff a certain piece of property located in
Section 34, Township 10 North, Range 3 West, SLB&M,
in Box Elder County, Utah, for the purchase price of
$4000 and to furnish an additional seven and one-half
acres of fully paid up water right in the Utah Idaho Sugar
Company. There was no dispute as to the purchase price,
nor the furnishing of the additional water right, which
~fr. Reeder did.
It was further agreed by the parties at the time ~1r.
Reeder delivered the memorandum to the Plaintiff that
interest was not to be charged, according to Plaintiffs
witness, until 90 days after tender of the deed ( T 34)
Very material to the case is the fact that Defendants
did not have title to the land in question at the time the
memorandum was delivered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted he knew the Defendants did not have title to the
land at the time the sale agreement ':vas made ( T 21).
Plaintiff and the Defendant, ~Ir. Reeder, both believed
it would be only a very short while until title was cleared
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( T 29). Further evidence of this belief was the testimony
given by Mr. Christensen (T 35-36) that Mr. Bott, Jr. had
applied for a loan to pay the purchase price during the
same year the memorandum was delivered.
Both parties were also aware that Geo. M. Mason,
a practicing attorney, was handling the matter of clearing
the title (T 30).
There was no conflict that ~ilr. Bott, Jr. was to take
possession immediately (T 30). Mr. Bott, Jr. testified
that he did take right over ( T 23) and that he has been
farming the property since that time, marketing the crops
and enjoying the full benefits and use of the property.
After the hearing of the testimony, the Court made
two findings of fact: ( 1) that Reeder was to give, in
effect, a warranty deed when he obtained a good title
from Holleys ( T 41), and ( 2) that the parties agreed
there was to be no interest until ninety days after Mr.
Reeder tendered the deed ( T 41 ) .
The Defendants have no argument with either finding.
The Court then went on to state: If not withstanding
the agreement, many years go by without fault of the
Seller, if you can find such a line of authorities, we11
charge Bott interest by way of rental.
Briefs were accordingly submitted. The Judge stated
at the hearing that he was of the frame of mind that Mr.
Bott shouldn't have possession of the ground for all that
period and have the use of the money for all that time as
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shocking the conscience (T 47), and held that the Defendants were entitled to interest from the date of Plaintiff's possession. The Court declined to charge interest
beyond the time Mr. Reeder first brought the matter of
the quiet title into Court ( T 44). Counsel for Defendants,
in an effort to cooperate with the Judge in this decision,
attempted to help fix the date of the first hearing.
At a later hearing the Court reversed himself and
decided that Defendants were not entitled to any interest.
So far as Defendants can determine this change of
mind on the part of the Court was brought about by a
re-consideration of the record wherein Mr. Reeder testified as follows: ( T 14).

Q. And what was said concerning the purchase
price?
A.

Well, I told him what the purchase price would
be.

Q. Four thousand dollars?
A.

That's right.

With a forty acre water right.

Q. Forty acre water right. When was he to pay
you the $4,000?
A.

Well, when we got the deed with title.

Q. And he hasn't got it yet?
A.

No.

Q. So that the $4,000 isn't due until you deliver
him title?
A.

That's right.
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The Court in its final decision stated ( T 61), "I
wanted to say in the record that Mr. Reeder in his testimony stated that he wanted no more than the amount
due~ and the reporter couldn't find anything in the record
to show me that Reeder had ever gone to Bott and talked
to him about an extension of time or stated that because
of ~lr. Mason that he couldn't get the title quieted, and
the record seems to be silent as far as Mr. Bott is concerned. There was never anything said. So I subscribe
to the doctrine of law that you presented, Miss Hansen,
but I can't apply it here because I can't find the facts to
justify it. I'll announce that's the law but there had to
be something happen then and neither Reeder nor Batt
testified to anything."
This conclusion is not consistent with the facts nor
with the law. The law as hereinafter quoted, confirms
the reasonableness of Defendants claim as well as the
right of Defendants to interest.
STATEMENT OF POINT
The lower Court erred in failing to grant Defendants
the interest as prayed for in their Amended Answer and
Counter Claim.
ARGUMENT
The lower Court erred in failing to grant to Defendants the interest prayed for in their Amended Answer
and Counter Claim.
The pertinent facts to be considered, in relation to
the law hereinafter quoted, are that there was a written
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memorandum which was silent as to interest; and that
there was an understanding by the parties that interest
not to be charged until after tender of a deed, which
understanding was based on a belief by the parties that
title would be cleared and a deed tendered immediately.
It is important to note that while the parties agreed
that interest was not to be charged until after tender of
the deed, there was no contract, or agreement, either
written or oral, which specified there would be no interest
charged regardless of any contingencies that might arise.
Since the matter was already in the hands of an attorney for the purpose of clearing the title, it could not
have been contemplated by the parties that a 17 year
delay would ensue.
There is a long quotation in American Jurisprudence
which Defendants feel is an excellent review of the law
in this type of case, and which we quote for the convenience of the Court:
"A disti.t"'lction has been made between the right
of the vendor to interest upon the u:Dpaid purchase
money at law and in equity. Where a contract provides for payment of the price and delivery of the
deed upon a certain date and the vendor without
excuse does not tender the deed until after such date,
in the absence of a contractm·al provision to the
contrary, it would seem clear that there is at law
no right to interest upon the unpaid purchase money
for any period before the deed is tendered by the
vendor, because at law the vendor's right to the
principal does not mature until the vendee is put in
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default by a due tender of the deed. But when
asked to enforce an agreement of this character,
equity proceeds with reference not only to the rights
of the parties under the agreement, but also with
reference to the position the parties assume to each
other after making the agreement, and the equities
that grow out thereof. Where pending the execution of an agreetnent for the sale of land which does
not provide for possession of the land, the vendee
takes possession of the land, a court of equity ordinarily \viii charge interest upon the unpaid purchase money. This is true although there is a delay
in the execution of the contract of sale by the vendor.
In equity the vendor is ordinarily entitled to interest
tvhere the purchaser is let into possession and no
provision is rrULde in the contract for a delay in the
execut-ion, although the failure to complete the contract is due to the fault of the vendor, and in such
a case in decreeing specific performance the purchaser is ~ a general rule to be charged with interest
on the purchase money from the time it should have
been paid if the contract had been carried out as
contemplated by the pa1ties, it being deemed inequitable that the purchaser should enjoy the benefit of the possession without liability for interest."
(Emphasis added. )
55 Am. Jur. Sec. 347, p. 774
An annotation in 25 ALR 2d, commencing at Page
951, states the general rule and digests numerous cases in
support thereof:
"In the absence of an express provision in a
land contract, the allowance of interest depends upon
the various equities of a particular situation, the
factor of possession being one of the most important.
It is stated generally that neither party should be
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able to enjoy both the beneficial use of the property
and the use of the purchase money without being
held accountable in some manner to the other party."
(This excerpt quoted in McDermott vs. Sher. 280
P. 2d, 660 (N.M.) (1955)
The Courts have confirmed the general rule stated
in the above quotation in the following specific cases:
"Where vendee was let into possession of a tract
of land under an agreement that the balance of the
purchase price thereof was not to be required of
him until certain defects in the title had been cured,
in holding, where he had not appropriated this unpaid balance to the use of the vendor, that he was
liable for interest thereon, the Court said: "The
record presents the case of a vendor who has delivered possession of the premises to the purchaser,
which he has continued to enjoy without molestation; of a vendor who has also faithfully complied
with his engagement that a good title should be made
upon the happening of a particular event, until which
event he has left the purchase money in the hands
of the vendee, as his security, and that vendee has
thus, for more than 18 years, by himself, or his vendee received the rents and profits, and held the
purchase money also. Is there any principal of law
or equity which can justify us in saying he shall keep
both? Shall the purchaser for so long a period receive the profits while he is enjoying the interest of
the purchase money? - for it would be wilful blindness to the ordinary course of transactions to suppose that this 1noney has lain idle. If raised at all,
it has been put to interest, beyond question, if not
raised, the interest has been saved to the party, which
amounts to the same thing; for in either event he
\vould have enjoyed the vendor's estate for 18 years
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for nothing. The injustice of such a proceeding has
long since given rise to the rule that, as to interest
and profits, the vendor is to be considered the owner
of the money and entitled to the interest, while the
vendee is regarded as the owner of the land and entitled to the profits. But he cannot have both."
7.5 A L R; 363 - ( Brockenbrough vs. Blythe)
3 Leigh (va) 619 (1832).
"It seems to be the general rule that as between
a vendor and purchaser interest is to be allowed to
the vendor on the purchase price where the vendee
is given possession of the property pending any
delay in the consumation of sale due to inability to
promptly perfect the title, etc. But it has also been
held that where the vendor wilfully and wrongfully
withholds the possession and also wrongfully fails
and refuses to consumate the sale until required
to do so by a decree for specific performance he will
nevertheless be allowed, in an accounting for the
ad interim rents, interest in such amount on the unpaid purchase price as does not exceed the amount
of rents and income received by him, forfeiting the
excess of interest if any."
Bands v. Rhoads, 35 So. 2d 437; Miss.

( 1948)

(Syllabus by the Courts: )
"The right in equity of a vendor to interest upon
the unpaid purchase money is distinguished from
such right of law.
"At law and in the absence of a contractural
provision to the contrary, the vendor's right to the
purchase price does not ordinarly mature until the
vendee is placed in default by a due and proper
tender of deed.
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"Equity proceeds not only with a recognition of
the contractural rights of the parties, but also with
an observance of the position assumed toward each
other by the respective parties during the period of
litigation and the equities arising therefrom.
"In equity the vendor is ordinarily entitled to
interest where the purchaser is let into possession and
no provision is made in the contract for a delay in
its execution although the failure to complete the
contract is due to the fault of the vendor, and in such
a case in decreeing specific performance the purchaser is as a general rule to be charged with interest
on the purchase money from the time it should have
been paid if the contract had been carried out as contemplated by the parties, it being deemed inequitable that the purchaser should enjoy the benefit of
the possession without liability for interest."
Volk vs. Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co.
59 A. 2d 387; N. J. (1948)
"The trial judge held that under the contract
plaintiff was entitled to interest on the installment
payments after the year 1940 at the rate of 4% per
annum. In so doing, he applied the rule in equity
under which it is held in suits involving the enforcement of contracts for the sale and purchase of real
estate that a purchaser under an executory contract
is under equitable obligation to pay interest upon
the unpaid purchase price where a situation not
covered by an express provision of the contract and
not contemplated by the parties has arisen, as where
the vendor delays performance to a purchaser in
possession and payment of the purchase price is
due at the time stipulated for the vendor's performance or where a purchaser takes possession before
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he is entitled to it. The basis of the rule in equity
is that it is inequitable in the first mentioned case
that the purchaser should enjoy the use and benefit
of both the land and the purchase money, where
payment of the purchase money is due, without paying interest on the purchase money to compensate
for the use of the land, and in the latter case that he
should have possession of the land before he is
entitled to it without paying interest to compensate
for the possession thus taken. Hence, it is said that
the purchaser should not have the benefit of the
possession of the land in such cases without liability
for interest on the purchase money. The equitable
obligation to pay interest is imposed to adjust the
equities of the parties where the contract itself contains no provision governing the situation.
Lund vs. Larsen; 24 N. W. 827; Minn. (1946)
(Also cited at 25 ALR 2d 954)
The case was not decided on this equitable principle;
the court holding that a different rule would apply
because of the patticular fact situation).
"The decided trend of courts of law and courts
of equity has been to break away from hard and fast
rules and charge and allow interest in accordance
with principles of equity, in order to accomplish
justice, in each patticular case."
Nagle Engine vs. City of Erie, 26 Erie 76.
The New Jersey case of Kleinert vs. De Chiaro, 130 A.
2d, 637 ( 1957), summarizes more recent cases regarding
the principal cited:
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"The rule in courts of equitable jurisdiction is
that in the absence of some incompatible equity a
purchaser in possession will be required to pay interest on the unpaid portion of the purchase price.
Volk v. Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co., 142 N. J.
Eq. 67, 59 A 2d 387 ( Ch. 1948 ) , and the cases there
collected; New Jersey Highway Authority v. Renner,
32 N.J Super. 197,201,108 A. 2d 107 (App. Div.
1954), affirmed 18 N.J. 485, 114 A. 2d 555 (1955);
Annotations, 75 A.L.R. 316, 325-332 (1931); 25 A.L.R.
2d 951, 956-959 ( 1952). It has been held that this
rule will be applied even though the delay in the
execution of the contract of sale arises by fault of
the vendor. Simonds v. Essex Passenger Ry. Co.,
57 N.J. Eq. 349, 353, 41 A. 682 ( Ch. 1898 ), quoted
with approval in Volk, above, 142 N.J. Eq. at pages
72-73, 59 A. 2d at page 391. The theory is that a
purchaser should not be able to enjoy the use and
profits of the land as well as the balance on the
purchase price without paying interest on the halance. "
In the Utah case of Farnsworth vs. Jensen et al, 217
P. 2d, 571 ( 1950), while the fact situation is considerably
different than that of the present case, the Court makes
some interesting observations. There was a specific contract in this case which required the payment of interest
by the vendee and also required the vendor to clear title
to the lands being sold. Vend or did not clear the title
when she should have, the vendees stopped making payments under the terms of the contract and contended they
did not owe interest during this period.
The Court commented:
"They admit the retention and use of the money
after the due dates of payments and ~:et seek to avoid
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the payment of interest on the amount retained because appellant was dilatory in clearing title."
This the Court held vendees could not do.

Jndge

Wolfe, in his concurring opinion reiterates the
general rule cited in the above cases.
"See the annotation at 75 ALR 316. It would
be inequitable to allow the purchaser to enjoy the
use of the land and at the same time allow him the
use of the purchase money to the loss of the vendor."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Appellants respectfully request that
the Supreme Court reverse the decision of the Honorable
Lewis Jones for the reasons and the law hereinbefore set
forth insofar as said decision denies interest to the Appellants on the balance of the purchase price due for lands
sold by Appellants to Respondent; and that the Court determine that Appellants are entitled to legal interest during the 17 year period of time Respondent enjoyed
possession and use of both land and the balance of the
purchase price while Appellants were endeavoring to clear
title to the lands sold to Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
'\7. EUGENE HANSEN
SHER~'IA

HANSEN

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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